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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910455526503321 |
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Titolo |
The economics of innovation [[electronic resource] ] : incentives, cooperation and R&D policy / / edited by Roberto Cellini, Luca Lambertini |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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ISBN |
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1-280-77166-6 |
9786613682437 |
1-84950-537-3 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (231 p.) |
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Collana |
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Contributions to economic analysis, , 0573-8555 ; ; 286 |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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CelliniRoberto |
LambertiniLuca |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Technological innovations - Economic aspects |
Industrial policy |
Incentives in industry |
Patents - Economic aspects |
Research and development partnership |
Research, Industrial |
Electronic books. |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Front cover; The Economics of Innovation; Copyright page; Contents; List of Contributors; The Editors' Preface; Part I: Patents; Chapter 1. Rent Dissipation in R&D Races; Abstract; 1. Introduction; 2. Model; 3. Noncooperative equilibrium; 4. Collusive outcome; 5. Rent dissipation; 6. Policy implications; 7. Conclusions; Acknowledgements; Appendix; References; Chapter 2. Innovation, Duplication, and the Contract Theory of Patents; Abstract; 1. Introduction; 2. The model; 3. Benchmark: no duplication; 4. Duplication with no licensing; 5. Preemptive licensing; 6. Beyond polar cases |
7. Concluding remarksAcknowledgements; References; Chapter 3. On Patent Licensing; Abstract; 1. Introduction; 2. The screening model of patent licensing; 3. The spatial model for patent licensing; 4. |
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International technology transfer and IPRs; 5. Conclusion; References; Part II: Information and cost sharing; Chapter 4. Spillovers, Stable R&D Cooperations, and Social Welfare; Abstract; 1. Introduction; 2. The models; 3. Stability of R&D cooperations and policy implications; 4. Concluding remarks; Appendix A; References; Chapter 5. Strategic R&D with Uncertainty; Abstract; 1. Introduction |
2. R&D production3. Product market competition; 4. Policy analysis; 5. Conclusions; References; Chapter 6. Coopting ``Decisive'' Technical Advances; Abstract; 1. Introduction; 2. The benchmark cases; 3. The giving cases; 4. The sharing cases; 5. Conclusions; References; Chapter 7. Efficiency of Joint Enterprises with Internal Bargaining; Abstract; 1. Introduction; 2. Basic model; 3. Illustrative examples; 4. Conclusion; Appendix A; References; Chapter 8. Equilibrium Research Joint Ventures; Abstract; 1. Introduction; 2. The model; 3. Independent R&D; 4. Research joint venture |
5. RJV formation among asymmetric firms6. Conclusion; Appendix A; References; Part III: Delegation and R&D incentives; Chapter 9. Product and Process Innovation in Differential Games with Managerial Firms; Abstract; 1. Introduction; 2. Product innovation; 3. Process innovation; 4. Conclusions; References; Chapter 10. Delegation in an R&D Game with Spillovers; Abstract; 1. Introduction; 2. The model; 3. The outcomes of the four subgames; 4. The discrete case; 5. The continuous case: a numerical analysis; 6. Further results and extensions of the model; 7. Conclusions; Appendix A; References |
Subject Index |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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A collection of original research papers by a number of industrial organization economists active in the field of Research and Development theory and policy. It covers patent policy, the effects of market structure and the internal organization of the fir |
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