1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910455482403321

Autore

Stueck William Whitney <1945->

Titolo

The Korean War [[electronic resource] ] : an international history / / William Stueck

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Princeton, N.J., : Princeton University Press, c1995

ISBN

1-282-75230-8

1-4008-2178-9

9786612752308

1-4008-1358-1

Edizione

[Course Book]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (497 p.)

Collana

Princeton studies in international history and politics

Disciplina

951.904/2

Soggetti

Korean War, 1950-1953

Korean War, 1950-1953 - Diplomatic history

Electronic books.

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references (p. [447]-468) and index.

Nota di contenuto

Front matter -- Contents -- List of Maps -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. The Origins Of The Korean War -- Chapter 2. The Diplomacy of Confrontation and Consolidation -- Chapter 3. Diplomacy Fails: The UN Counteroffensive and Chinese Intervention -- Chapter 4. Limiting the War -- Chapter 5. The Dimensions of Collective Action -- Chapter 6. Armistice Talks: Origins and Initial Stages -- Chapter 7. Progress -- Chapter 8. Deadlock -- Chapter 9. Concluding An Armistice -- Chapter 10. The Korean war as International History -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index

Sommario/riassunto

This first truly international history of the Korean War argues that by its timing, its course, and its outcome it functioned as a substitute for World War III. Stueck draws on recently available materials from seven countries, plus the archives of the United Nations, presenting a detailed narrative of the diplomacy of the conflict and a broad assessment of its critical role in the Cold War. He emphasizes the contribution of the United Nations, which at several key points in the conflict provided an important institutional framework within which less powerful nations were able to restrain the aggressive tendencies of the United States. In



Stueck's view, contributors to the U.N. cause in Korea provided support not out of any abstract commitment to a universal system of collective security but because they saw an opportunity to influence U.S. policy. Chinese intervention in Korea in the fall of 1950 brought with it the threat of world war, but at that time and in other instances prior to the armistice in July 1953, America's NATO allies and Third World neutrals succeeded in curbing American adventurism. While conceding the tragic and brutal nature of the war, Stueck suggests that it helped to prevent the occurrence of an even more destructive conflict in Europe.