1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910454217403321

Autore

Alexander Larry <1943->

Titolo

Crime and culpability : a theory of criminal law / / by Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan with contributions by Stephen J. Morse [[electronic resource]]

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2009

ISBN

1-107-19182-3

1-283-33043-1

1-139-13494-9

9786613330437

0-511-80459-8

1-139-12990-2

1-139-13383-7

0-511-50495-0

0-511-50709-7

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (xiii, 358 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)

Collana

Cambridge introductions to philosophy and law

Disciplina

345/.001

Soggetti

Punishment - Philosophy

Criminal law - Philosophy

Criminal law - United States - Philosophy

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references (p. 331-348) and index.

Nota di contenuto

Part One. Introduction : retributivism and the criminal law. Criminal law, punishment, and desert -- Part Two. The culpable choice. The essence of culpability : acts manifesting insufficient concern for the legally protected interests of others ; Negligence ; Defeaters of culpability -- Part Three. The culpable act. Only culpability, not resulting harm, affects desert ; When are inchoate crimes culpable and why? ; The locus of culpability -- Part Four. A proposed code. What a culpability-based criminal code might look like.

Sommario/riassunto

This book presents a comprehensive overview of what the criminal law would look like if organised around the principle that those who deserve punishment should receive punishment commensurate with,



but no greater than, that which they deserve. Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan argue that desert is a function of the actor's culpability, and that culpability is a function of the risks of harm to protected interests that the actor believes he is imposing and his reasons for acting in the face of those risks. The authors deny that resultant harms, as well as unperceived risks, affect the actor's desert. They thus reject punishment for inadvertent negligence as well as for intentions or preparatory acts that are not risky. Alexander and Ferzan discuss the reasons for imposing risks that negate or mitigate culpability, the individuation of crimes, and omissions.