1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910452719203321

Autore

Kalinovsky Artemy M

Titolo

A long goodbye [[electronic resource] ] : the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan / / Artemy M. Kalinovsky

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Cambridge, Mass., : Harvard University Press, 2011

ISBN

0-674-06104-7

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (304 pages) : illustrations, maps

Disciplina

958.104/5

Soggetti

Disengagement (Military science)

Electronic books.

Soviet Union Foreign relations Afghanistan

Afghanistan Foreign relations Soviet Union

Afghanistan History Soviet occupation, 1979-1989

Soviet Union Foreign relations 1975-1985

Soviet Union Foreign relations 1985-1991

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Nota di contenuto

The reluctant intervention -- The turn toward diplomacy -- Gorbachev confronts Afghanistan -- The national reconciliation campaign -- Engaging with the Americans -- The Army withdraws and the Politburo debates -- Soviet policy adrift.

Sommario/riassunto

The conflict in Afghanistan looms large in the collective consciousness of Americans. What has the United States achieved, and how will it withdraw without sacrificing those gains? The Soviet Union confronted these same questions in the 1980's, and Artemy Kalinovsky's history of the USSR's nine-year struggle to extricate itself from Afghanistan and bring its troops home provides a sobering perspective on exit options in the region. What makes Kalinovsky's intense account both timely and important is its focus not on motives for initiating the conflict but on the factors that prevented the Soviet leadership from ending a demoralizing war. Why did the USSR linger for so long, given that key elites recognized the blunder of the mission shortly after the initial deployment? Newly available archival material, supplemented by interviews with major actors, allows Kalinovsky to reconstruct the fierce



debates among Soviet diplomats, KGB officials, the Red Army, and top Politburo figures. The fear that withdrawal would diminish the USSR's status as leader of the Third World is palpable in these disagreements, as are the competing interests of Afghan factions and the Soviet Union's superpower rival in the West. This book challenges many widely held views about the actual costs of the conflict to the Soviet leadership, and its findings illuminate the Cold War context of a military engagement that went very wrong, for much too long.