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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910452714203321 |
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Autore |
Wilson Fred |
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Titolo |
Body, mind and self in Hume's critical realism [[electronic resource] /] / Fred Wilson |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Frankfurt, : Ontos Verlag, 2008 |
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ISBN |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (553 p.) |
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Collana |
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Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical analysis ; ; Bd. 22 |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Mind and body |
Self |
Electronic books. |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Frontmatter -- Acknowledgments -- Note -- Table of Contents -- Introduction -- Endnotes to Introduction -- Chapter One: Self as Substance -- Chapter Two: Nominalism and Acquaintance -- Chapter Three: From the Substance Tradition through Locke to Hume: Ordinary Things and Critical Realism -- Chapter Four: The Disappearance of the Simple Self: Its Problems -- Chapter Five: Hume's Positive Account of the Self -- Bibliography -- Index of Names -- Backmatter |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This essay proposes that Hume's non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume's metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume's account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one's character that constitutes one's identity; and that sympathy and the passions of |
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