1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910452712503321

Autore

Soom Patrice

Titolo

From psychology to neuroscience [[electronic resource] ] : a new reductive account / / Patrice Soom

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Frankfurt ; ; New Brunswick, : Ontos Verlag, 2011

ISBN

3-11-032262-5

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (322 p.)

Collana

Epistemische Studien : Schriften zur Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie ; ; Bd. 21

Disciplina

158.1

Soggetti

Mind and body

Philosophy of mind

Psychology - Philosophy

Neurosciences - Philosophy

Electronic books.

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Nota di contenuto

Frontmatter -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSATION -- 3. ONTOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM -- 4. PSYCHOLOGY AND NEUROSCIENCE -- 5. EPISTEMOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM -- 6. REDUCTION BY MEANS OF FUNCTIONAL SUB-TYPES -- 7. REDUCTION OF PSYCHOLOGY TO NEUROSCIENCE: CASES STUDIES -- 8. FINAL REMARKS -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX

Sommario/riassunto

This book explores the mind-body issue from both the perspectives of philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. Starting from the problem of mental causation, it provides an overview of the contemporary metaphysical discussion and argues in favour of the token-identity thesis, as the only position that can account for the causal efficacy of the mental. Showing furthermore that this ontological reductionism is not dissociable from epistemological reductionism, the author applies a new strategy of inter-theoretic reduction, which is compatible with the multiple realizability of mental properties. Using functionally defined sub-types, this account establishes a conservative reduction of psychology to neuroscience, which vindicates both the



scientific legitimacy and the theoretical indispensability of psychology. This account is illustrated by several empirical examples borrowed from contemporary neuroscience.