1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910452581103321

Autore

Hess Markus Patrick

Titolo

Is truth the primary epistemic goal? [[electronic resource] /] / Markus Patrick Hess

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Frankfurt, : Ontos Verlag, 2010

ISBN

3-11-032955-7

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (169 p.)

Collana

Epistemische Studien : Schriften zue Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie ; ; Bd. 17

Disciplina

100

Soggetti

Truth - Philosophy

Knowledge, Theory of

Goal (Philosophy)

Electronic books.

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references.

Nota di contenuto

Frontmatter -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgments: -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Can Truth Be an Epistemic Goal? -- 3. The Value of Truth -- 4. Requirements of the Truth Goal -- 5. The Primacy of the Truth Goal -- 6. Alternative Monism -- 7. The Value of Knowledge -- 8. Conclusion -- 9. Appendix: Overcoming the Problem of Epistemic Relativism -- Bibliography

Sommario/riassunto

This book is focused on a problem that has aroused the most controversy in recent epistemological debate, which is whether the truth can or cannot be the fundamental epistemic goal. Traditional epistemology has presupposed the centrality of truth without giving a deeper analysis. To epistemic value pluralists, the claim that truth is the fundamental value seems unjustified. Their central judgement is that we can be in a situation where we do not attain truth but something else that is also epistemically valuable. In contrast, epistemic value monists are committed to the view that one can only