|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910452484403321 |
|
|
Autore |
Keen Michael |
|
|
Titolo |
Coordinating climate and trade policies [[electronic resource] ] : Pareto efficiency and the role of border tax adjustments / / prepared by Michael Keen and Christos Kotsogiannis |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Pubbl/distr/stampa |
|
|
Washington, D.C., : International Monetary Fund, c2012 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ISBN |
|
1-4755-1485-9 |
1-4755-2046-8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Descrizione fisica |
|
1 online resource (27 p.) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Collana |
|
IMF working paper ; ; WP/12/289 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Altri autori (Persone) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Soggetti |
|
Climatic changes - Government policy |
Commercial policy - Environmental aspects |
Taxation - Environmental aspects |
Electronic books. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Lingua di pubblicazione |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
|
|
|
|
|
Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
|
|
|
|
|
Note generali |
|
Description based upon print version of record. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nota di bibliografia |
|
Includes bibliographical references. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nota di contenuto |
|
Cover; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Modeling Climate and Trade Policies; III. The Benchmark: Unconstrained Carbon Tax and Tariff Policies; IV. Pareto Efficiency and the Role of Border Tax Adjustments; A. Border Tax Adjustments in the Absence of Distributional Concerns; B. Border Tax Adjustments in the General Case; V. Further Discussion; A. Comparison with Non-cooperative Policies; B. Border Tax Adjustment and Cap-and-Trade; VI. Concluding Remarks; Appendices; A. Necessary Conditions for Pareto Efficiency; B. Proof of Proposition 1; C. Proof of Proposition 2; D. Proof of Proposition 5 |
References |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sommario/riassunto |
|
This paper explores the role of trade instruments in globally efficient climate policies, focusing on the central issue of whether some form of border tax adjustment (BTA) is warranted when carbon prices differ internationally. It shows that tariff policy has a role in easing cross-country distributional concerns that can make non-uniform carbon pricing efficient and, more particularly, that Pareto-efficiency requires a form of BTA when carbon taxes in some countries are constrained, a special case being identified in which this has the simple structure |
|
|
|
|