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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910451033203321 |
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Autore |
Williams Meredith <1947-> |
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Titolo |
Wittgenstein, mind, and meaning [[electronic resource] ] : toward a social conception of mind / / Meredith Williams |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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London ; ; New York, : Routledge, 1999 |
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ISBN |
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1-280-18660-7 |
9786610186600 |
0-203-21704-7 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (335 p.) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Philosophy of mind |
Language and languages - Philosophy |
Philosophy and cognitive science |
Electronic books. |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references (p. [306]-311) and indexes. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Book Cover; Title; Contents; Preface; Acknowledgments; List of abbreviations; Introduction; Against the philosophic tradition; Wittgenstein on representations, privileged objects, and private languages; Private states and public practices: Wittgenstein and Schutz on intentionality; Wittgenstein, Kant, and the ~metaphysics of experience~; Language learning and the representational theory of mind; Postscript to Chapter 4; Social norms and narrow content; A new direction; Rules, community, and the individual; The philosophical significance of learning in the later Wittgenstein |
The etiology of the obvious: Wittgenstein and the elimination of indeterminacyWittgenstein's rejection of scientific psychology; Vygotsky's social theory of mind; Notes; Bibliography; Index of quotations; Index |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning offers a provocative re-reading of Wittgenstein's later writings on language and mind, and explores the tensions between Wittgenstein's ideas and contemporary cognitivist conceptions of the mental. This book addresses both Wittgenstein's |
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