1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910449937203321

Autore

Kang David C (David Chan-oong), <1965->

Titolo

Crony capitalism : corruption and development in South Korea and the Philippines / / David C. Kang [[electronic resource]]

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2002

ISBN

1-107-12465-4

1-280-42140-1

0-511-17605-8

0-511-04191-8

0-511-15678-2

0-511-30423-4

0-511-60617-6

0-511-04455-0

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (xv, 203 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)

Collana

Cambridge studies in comparative politics

Disciplina

320.95195

Soggetti

Political corruption - Korea (South)

Political corruption - Philippines

Korea (South) Economic policy 1960-1988

Korea (South) Economic policy 1988-2002

Philippines Economic policy

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Nota di contenuto

Cover; Half-title; Series-title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Figures; Acknowledgments; 1 The Puzzle and the Theory; 2 Comparing Korea and the Philippines; 3 Institutions: Bureaucrats and Rulers; 4 Mutual Hostages in Korea; 5 Bandwagoning Politics in the Philippines; 6 Democracy in the 1980's and the Financial Crisis of 1997; 7 Conclusion: Corruption and Development; Index

Sommario/riassunto

Why has the literature on Asian development not addressed the issue of money politics in Korea? How can we reconcile the view of an efficient developmental state in Korea before 1997 with reports of massive corruption and inefficiency in that same country in 1998 and 1999? Politics is central to the answer. In this book the author makes two



arguments. First, both Korea and the Philippines experienced significant corruption throughout the post-independence era. Second, political - not economic - considerations dominated policy making in both countries. Focusing on the exchange of favors for bribes between state and business, the author argues that politics drove policy choices, that bureaucrats were not autonomous from political interference in setting policy, and that business and political elites wrestled with each other over who would reap the rents to be had. Even in Korea, corruption was far greater than the conventional wisdom allows.