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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910390857603321 |
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Autore |
Mitchell David |
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Titolo |
Sartre, Nietzsche and Non-Humanist Existentialism [[electronic resource] /] / by David Mitchell |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Palgrave Macmillan, , 2020 |
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ISBN |
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Edizione |
[1st ed. 2020.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (ix, 192 pages) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Nota di contenuto |
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1. Introduction: Existentialism and Humanism -- 2. Nietzsche's Non-humanist Existentialism: Perversity and Genealogy -- 3. Nietzsche's Non-humanist Existentialism: Secondary Perversion and the Slave Revolt -- 4. Sartre, Nothingness and Perversity -- 5. Sartre, Perversity and Self-Evasion -- 6. Sartre, Perversity and Self-Deception. . |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This book argues that existentialism’s concern with human existence does not simply make it another form of humanism. Influenced by Heidegger’s 1947 ‘Letter on Humanism’, structuralist and post-structuralist critics have both argued that existentialism is synonymous with a naïve ‘humanist’ idea of the subject. Such identification has led to the movement’s dismissal as a credible philosophy; this book aims to challenge such a view. Through a lucid and thought-provoking exploration of the concept of perversity in Sartre and Nietzsche, Mitchell argues that understanding the human as a ‘perversion’ of something other than itself allows us to have a philosophy of the human without the humanist subject. In short, through perversion, we can talk about the human as not merely having a relation to the world, but of being that relation. With an explicit defence of Sartre against the charge of humanism, accompanied by a novel and distinctive reinterpretation of Nietzsche, Mitchell recovers an existentialism that is at once both radical and philosophically relevant. . |
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