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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910337684803321 |
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Autore |
Faye Jan |
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Titolo |
How Matter Becomes Conscious : A Naturalistic Theory of the Mind / / by Jan Faye |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Palgrave Macmillan, , 2019 |
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ISBN |
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Edizione |
[1st ed. 2019.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (340 pages) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Philosophy and science |
Philosophy of mind |
Philosophy of Science |
Philosophy of Mind |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Chapter 1: Flipping the Debate -- Chapter 2: Our Animal Mind -- Chapter 3: Subjectivity in a Biological Perspective -- Chapter 4: A Difference That Is No Difference -- Chapter 5: Why Identity Is Not Enough -- Chapter 6: Functionalism, Mechanisms, and Levels of Reality -- Chapter 7: The Environment Is What Matters -- Chapter 8: Understanding Consciousness -- Chapter 9: Conclusion. |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This innovative book proposes a unique and original perspective on the nature of the mind and how phenomenal consciousness may arise in a physical world. From simple sentient organisms to complex self-reflective systems, Faye argues for a naturalistic-evolutionary approach to philosophy of mind and consciousness. Drawing on substantial literature in evolutionary biology and cognitive science, this book offers a promising alternative to the major theories of the mind-body problem: the quality of our experiences should not, as some philosophers have claimed, be associated with subjectivity that is not open for scientific explanation, nor should it be associated with intrinsic properties of the brain. Instead, Faye argues that mental properties are extrinsic properties of the brain caused by the organism’ |
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s interaction with its environment. Taking on the explanatory gap, and rejecting the ontological pluralism of present naturalist theories of the mind, Faye thus proposes a unified view of reality in which it is possible to explain qualitative mental presentations as part of the physical world. . |
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