1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910300617803321

Autore

Niiniluoto Ilkka

Titolo

Truth-Seeking by Abduction / / by Ilkka Niiniluoto

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2018

ISBN

3-319-99157-4

Edizione

[1st ed. 2018.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (188 pages)

Collana

Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, , 0166-6991 ; ; 400

Disciplina

160

Soggetti

Epistemology

Linguistics

Mathematical logic

Logic

Philosophy and science

Theoretical Linguistics

Mathematical Logic and Foundations

Philosophy of Science

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Nota di contenuto

Preface -- Chapter 1. Peirce on Abduction -- Chapter 2. Analysis and Synthesis -- Chapter 3. Abduction and Logic -- Chapter 4. Inverse Problems -- Chapter 5. Abduction as Discovery and Pursuit -- Chapter 6. Abduction and Confirmation -- Chapter 7. Inference to the Best Explanation -- Chapter 8. Abduction and Truthlikeness -- Chapter 9. Abduction and Scientific Realism -- Bibliography -- Index.

Sommario/riassunto

This book examines the philosophical conception of abductive reasoning as developed by Charles S. Peirce, the founder of American pragmatism. It explores the historical and systematic connections of Peirce's original ideas and debates about their interpretations. Abduction is understood in a broad sense which covers the discovery and pursuit of hypotheses and inference to the best explanation. The analysis presents fresh insights into this notion of reasoning, which derives from effects to causes or from surprising observations to explanatory theories. The author outlines some logical and AI



approaches to abduction as well as studies various kinds of inverse problems in astronomy, physics, medicine, biology, and human sciences to provide examples of retroductions and abductions. The discussion covers also everyday examples with the implication of this notion in detective stories, one of Peirce’s own favorite themes. The author uses Bayesian probabilities to argue that explanatory abduction is a method of confirmation. He uses his own account of truth approximation to reformulate abduction as inference which leads to the truthlikeness of its conclusion. This allows a powerful abductive defense of scientific realism. This up-to-date survey and defense of the Peircean view of abduction may very well help researchers, students, and philosophers better understand the logic of truth-seeking.