1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910299657503321

Autore

Felsenthal Dan S

Titolo

Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate : Proving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes / / by Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2018

ISBN

3-319-74033-4

Edizione

[1st ed. 2018.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (XV, 134 p.)

Collana

SpringerBriefs in Economics, , 2191-5504

Disciplina

324.6

Soggetti

Welfare economics

Elections

Political science - Philosophy

Economics

Democracy

Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy

Electoral Politics

Political Philosophy

Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references at the end of each chapters.

Nota di contenuto

Introduction -- Voting Paradoxes -- Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate -- The (In)Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that are Not Condorcet-Consistent to Various Paradoxes -- The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet-Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- Summary.

Sommario/riassunto

This book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, published by Springer in 2017, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of procedures



thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.