1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910298963803321

Autore

Davi Lucas

Titolo

Building Secure Defenses Against Code-Reuse Attacks / / by Lucas Davi, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2015

ISBN

3-319-25546-0

Edizione

[1st ed. 2015.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (83 p.)

Collana

SpringerBriefs in Computer Science, , 2191-5768

Disciplina

005.8

Soggetti

Computer security

Computer programming

Programming languages (Electronic computers)

Computers

Systems and Data Security

Programming Techniques

Programming Languages, Compilers, Interpreters

Information Systems and Communication Service

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references at the end of each chapters.

Nota di contenuto

Introduction -- Background and Evolution of Code-Reuse Attacks -- Building Control-Flow Integrity Defenses -- Building Code Randomization Defenses -- Discussion and Conclusion.

Sommario/riassunto

This book provides an in-depth look at return-oriented programming attacks. It explores several conventional return-oriented programming attacks and analyzes the effectiveness of defense techniques including address space layout randomization (ASLR) and the control-flow restrictions implemented in security watchdogs such as Microsoft EMET. Chapters also explain the principle of control-flow integrity (CFI), highlight the benefits of CFI and discuss its current weaknesses. Several improved and sophisticated return-oriented programming attack techniques such as just-in-time return-oriented programming are presented. Building Secure Defenses against Code-Reuse Attacks is an excellent reference tool for researchers, programmers and professionals working in the security field. It provides advanced-level



students studying computer science with a comprehensive overview and clear understanding of important runtime attacks.