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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910255347303321 |
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Autore |
Arvan Marcus |
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Titolo |
Rightness as Fairness [[electronic resource] ] : A Moral and Political Theory / / by Marcus Arvan |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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London : , : Palgrave Macmillan UK : , : Imprint : Palgrave Macmillan, , 2016 |
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ISBN |
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Edizione |
[1st ed. 2016.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (283 p.) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Political philosophy |
Social sciences—Philosophy |
Political theory |
Ethics |
World politics |
Political Philosophy |
Social Philosophy |
Political Theory |
Moral Philosophy |
Political History |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Cover; Half-Title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction; 1 Ethics for the Twenty-First Century; 1 Distinguishing truth from seeming truth; 2 Seven principles of theory selection; 2.1 Firm Foundations; 2.2 Internal Coherence; 2.3 External Coherence; 2.4 Explanatory Power; 2.5 Unity; 2.6 Parsimony; 2.7 Fruitfulness; 3 The case for instrumentalism; 3.1 The firmest foundation; 3.2 The promise of parsimony, unity, explanatory power, and fruitfulness; 3.3 Advantages over alternatives; 3.3.1 Advantages over intuitionism; 3.3.2 Advantages over reflective equilibrium |
3.3.3 Advantages over moral language analysis3.3.4 Advantages over constitutivism; 3.3.5 Advantages over second- and third-personalism; 3.3.6 Advantages over Sterba's dialecticalism; 3.3.7 Conclusion; 4 Disarming initial concerns; 4.1 The wrong kinds of reasons?; 4.2 Not a |
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firm foundation?; 4.3 Unconvincing and artificial?; 4.4 Three promissory notes; 4.4.1 Not the wrong kinds of reasons?; 4.4.2 Firm foundations after all?; 4.4.3 Intuitive and convincing?; 5 Conclusion; 2 The Problem of Possible Future Selves; 1 Our capacities to care about our past and future |
2 The problem of possible future selves2.1 Possible futures; 2.2 Possible psychologies; 2.3 Possible choices; 2.4 A very real problem; 3 Morality as the solution?; 4 Is the problem too contingent?; 5 Two nonsolutions; 5.1 Nonsolution 1: probable futures; 5.2 Nonsolution 2: diachronic motivational consistency; 6 Conclusion: an unsolved problem; 3 The Categorical-Instrumental Imperative; 1 Interests in diachronic cooperation; 2 Three types of interests; 2.1 Involuntary interests; 2.2 Semivoluntary interests; 2.3 Voluntary interests; 3 The Categorical-Instrumental Imperative; 4 Just conscience? |
5 An intuitive solution to the problem of possible future selves?6 Conclusion; 4 Three Unified Formulations; 1 The Humanity and Sentience Formulation; 1.1 Possible other-human-regarding interests; 1.2 Possible nonhuman-animal-regarding interests; 1.3 Possible sentient-being-regarding interests; 1.4 Derivation of the Humanity and Sentience Formulation; 2 The Kingdom of Human and Sentient Ends Formulation; 3 Advantages over Kantian ethics; 3.1 Firmer foundations; 3.2 Greater internal coherence; 3.3 Greater external coherence; 3.4 Greater explanatory power, unity, and parsimony |
3.5 Greater fruitfulness4 Conclusion; 5 The Moral Original Position; 1 Rawls' Original Position; 1.1 Rawls' Kantian rationale; 1.2 Rawls' reflective equilibrium rationale; 1.3 Rawls' public reason rationale; 2 Some common critiques; 2.1 Kantian critiques; 2.2 Reflective equilibrium critiques; 2.3 Public reason critiques; 3 The case for a Moral Original Position; 4 Corroborating the critiques; 4.1 Corroborating Kantian critiques; 4.2 Corroborating reflective equilibrium critiques; 4.3 Corroborating public reason critiques; 5 Conclusion; 6 Rightness as Fairness |
1 Derivation of Four Principles of Fairness |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Moral philosophy today is marked by profound, systematic disagreement. In Rightness as Fairness, Marcus Arvan argues that the field of moral philosophy must adapt scientific principles in order to move closer to discovering moral truth. Arvan argues that our best empirical evidence and natural observation reveal morality to be a type of prudence requiring us to act in ways that our present and future selves can rationally agree upon across time. Arvan shows that this agreement between our present and future selves - Rightness as Fairness - is fundamentally a matter of being fair to ourselves and to others, including animals. Further, the Four Principles of Fairness comprising this agreement reconcile several opposing moral and political frameworks, including libertarianism and egalitarianism. Rightness as Fairness provides a uniquely fruitful method of 'principled fair negotiation' for resolving applied moral and political issues that requires merging principled debate with real-world negotiation. |
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