1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910255336803321

Autore

Willmott Chris

Titolo

Biological Determinism, Free Will and Moral Responsibility : Insights from Genetics and Neuroscience / / by Chris Willmott

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2016

ISBN

3-319-30391-0

Edizione

[1st ed. 2016.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (95 p.)

Collana

SpringerBriefs in Ethics, , 2211-8101

Disciplina

100

Soggetti

Ethics

Criminal law

Neurosciences

Psychology

Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law

Popular Science in Psychology

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references.

Nota di contenuto

Preface -- Chapter 1: Free will and determinism -- Chapter 2: Existing legislation on mental disorders and criminal cases -- Chapter 3: Biological Basis of Behaviour -- Chapter 4: Use of genetic and neuroscientific evidence in criminal cases: a brief history of “neurolaw” -- Chapter 5: Are we ready for an expanded use of neuroscientific evidence in the courtroom?.

Sommario/riassunto

This book examines the way in which new discoveries about genetic and neuroscience are influencing our understanding of human behaviour. As scientists unravel more about the ways in which genes and the environment work together to shape the development of our brains, their studies have importance beyond the narrow confines of the laboratory. This emerging knowledge has implications for our notions of morality and criminal responsibility. The extent to which “biological determinism” can be used as an explanation for our behaviour is of interest to philosophers reflecting on the free will versus determinism debate. It also has repercussions for the criminal justice system; in courtrooms around the world, defence lawyers are



beginning to appeal to genetic and brain imaging data as grounds for finding their clients not guilty. Can a defendant’s genes or the structure of his brain be used as an excuse for his behaviour? Is criminality “hardwired”? Is it legitimate to claim “I couldn’t help it, my genes made me do it”? This book appeals to anyone interested in the link between behaviour and genetics, the science and philosophy of moral responsibility and/or criminal law.