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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910254897303321 |
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Autore |
Munoz-Garcia Felix |
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Titolo |
Strategy and Game Theory : Practice Exercises with Answers / / by Felix Munoz-Garcia, Daniel Toro-Gonzalez |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2016 |
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ISBN |
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Edizione |
[1st ed. 2016.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (XII, 345 p. 259 illus., 156 illus. in color.) |
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Collana |
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Springer Texts in Business and Economics, , 2192-4333 |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Game theory |
Economics - Psychological aspects |
Game Theory |
Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences |
Behavioral/Experimental Economics |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Chapter 1: Dominance Solvable Games -- Chapter 2: Pure Strategy Nash equilibrium and Simultaneous move games with complete information -- Chapter 3: Mixed Strategies, Strictly competitive games, and Correlated Equilibria -- Chapter 4: Sequential-move games with complete information -- Chapter 5: Applications to Industrial Organization -- Chapter 6: Repeated Games and Correlated Equilibria -- Chapter 7: Simultaneous‐move games with Incomplete Information -- Chapter 8: Auctions -- Chapter 9: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Signaling games -- Chapter 10: More advanced signaling games. |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This textbook presents worked-out exercises on game theory with detailed step-by-step explanations. While most textbooks on game theory focus on theoretical results, this book focuses on providing practical examples in which students can learn to systematically apply theoretical solution concepts to different fields of economics and business. The text initially presents games that are required in most courses at the undergraduate level and gradually advances to more challenging games appropriate for masters level courses. The first six chapters cover complete-information games, separately analyzing |
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simultaneous-move and sequential-move games, with applications in industrial economics, law, and regulation. Subsequent chapters dedicate special attention to incomplete information games, such as signaling games, cheap talk games, and equilibrium refinements, emphasizing common steps and including graphical illustrations to focus students’ attention on the most relevant payoff comparisons at each point of the analysis. In addition, exercises are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise number. This allows students to pace their studies and instructors to structure their classes accordingly. By providing detailed worked-out examples, this text gives students at various levels the tools they need to apply the tenets of game theory in many fields of business and economics. This text is appropriate for introductory-to-intermediate courses in game theory at the upper undergraduate and master’s level. . |
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