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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910220158803321 |
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Autore |
Long Austin G |
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Titolo |
Doctrine of eternal recurrence : the U.S. military and counterinsurgency doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006 / / Austin Long |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Santa Monica, CA, : Rand National Defense Research Institute, 2008 |
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ISBN |
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1-282-03316-6 |
9786612033162 |
0-8330-4535-0 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (47 p.) |
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Collana |
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Rand counterinsurgency study. Paper ; ; 6 |
Occasional paper ; ; OP-200-OSD |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Counterinsurgency - United States |
Military doctrine - United States |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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"Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense." |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references (p. 31-34). |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Cover; Preface; Contents; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence-The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine; Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: Defining the Terms; Small Wars Before COIN: U.S. Experiences Prior to 1960; The Kennedy Years: The Birth of COIN Doctrine; Limits of Doctrine: Vietnam, 1961 to 1963; Attempts to Put Doctrine into Practice: The PROVN Study, 1965 to 1966; COIN as Practiced: Vietnam, 1965 to 1968; Doctrine in the Late 1960s; COIN as Practiced: Vietnam, 1969 to 1972; Interlude: COIN and the Military, 1973 to 2003 |
COIN Doctrine, 2003 to 2005COIN Operations, 2003 to 2005; Doctrine and Operations in 2006; Getting It Right? COIN in Iraq, 2007; Komer's Lament: COIN Doctrine vs. COIN Practice; Conclusion; References |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This paper tests and ultimately disproves the assumption that doctrine as written and operations as conducted are tightly linked. Ingrained organizational concepts and beliefs have a much greater influence on operations than written doctrine. |
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