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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910220157703321 |
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Titolo |
Insights from selected case studies [[electronic resource] /] / Angel Rabasa ... [et al.] |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Santa Monica, Calif., : RAND Corporation, 2011 |
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ISBN |
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1-283-59733-0 |
9786613909787 |
0-8330-5317-5 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (321 p.) |
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Collana |
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From insurgency to stability ; ; v. 2 |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Counterinsurgency |
Peace-building |
United States Armed Forces Stability operations Case studies |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures and Maps; Tables; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Chapter One: Introduction; Background; The Transition from Counterinsurgency to Stability; The Case Studies; Chapter Two: The Philippines; Introduction: Background of the Communist Conflict in the Philippines; Counterinsurgency Under Marcos; The Post-Marcos Period; Strategy; CPP/NPA; The Philippine State; Self-Defense Militias; AFP COIN Progress; Transition?; Conclusion: Lessons for the United States; Chapter Three: Counterinsurgency Transition Case Study: Colombia |
Nature and Scope of the ConflictInternational and Transnational Actors; Strategy (Pre-Transition); Colombian Government Strategy; Insurgent Strategy; External Powers Supporting Belligerents; Key Strengths and Weaknesses of the Strategies; How the Parties Define "Victory"; The Transition Period; Managing the Transition; Institutional Framework: Theory and Practice; Stages of Transition; Implementation: What Is the Actual Experience of the ColombianTransition?; Gaps; Conclusions; Assessment of Colombian Transition Plan; Prospects for the Future |
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What Capabilities Does the United States Need to Have or Need toDevelop?Chapter Four: Counterinsurgency Transition Case Study: El Salvador; Introduction; Strategy (Pre-Transition); The Transition Period; Domestic Factors; The United States' Role; The Role of the International Community; Managing the Transition; Ceasefire and Demobilization; Public Security and Security-Sector Reform; ESAF Reform; Police Reform; Human Rights, Truth and Reconciliation; Addressing the Factors Contributing to the Insurgency; Conclusions; A Successful Transition?; Lessons Learned |
Chapter Five: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali, 2006-2009Introduction; Background: Mali's North-South Divide; A History of Contestation; Phase 1: The ADC Rebellion, May-July 2006; Introduction: Brief History of the Conflict Leading Up to thePeriod of Transition; Strategy (Pre-Transition); The Transition Period; Managing the Transition; Phase 2: The ATNM Rebellion (May 2007-February 2009); Introduction: Brief History of the Conflict Leading Up to thePeriod of Transition; Strategy (Pre-Transition); The Transition Period; Managing the Transition; Conclusions |
Chapter Six: The Transition in Al-Anbar, IraqIntroduction; A Brief History of the Conflict in Al-Anbar Province; Pre-Transition Strategy, 2005-2006; Insurgent Strategies in the Pre-Transition Period; External Powers Supporting the Anbar Insurgents; Counterinsurgency and Transition, 2006-2008; The Transition in Anbar: Contributing Factors; False Starts and Missed Opportunities on the Road to Transition; External Actors' Understanding of the Changing ConflictDynamics; Setting the Stage for and Managing the Transition; Transition Process Components; Signs the Coalition Forces Were "Winning" |
The Transition Outcome in Al-Anbar |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This book examines six case studies of insurgencies from around the world to determine the key factors necessary for a successful transition from counterinsurgency to a more stable situation. The authors review the causes of each insurgency and the key players involved, and examine what the government did right--or wrong--to bring the insurgency to an end and to transition to greater stability. |
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