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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910220131303321 |
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Titolo |
Networked forces in stability operations : 101st Airborne Division, 3/2 and 1/25 Stryker brigades in northern Iraq / / Daniel Gonzales ... [et al.] |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Santa Monica, Calif., : Rand Corp., 2007 |
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ISBN |
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1-281-43023-4 |
9786611430238 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (221 p.) |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Command and control systems - United States - Evaluation |
Communications, Military - Evaluation |
Stryker brigade combat teams - Evaluation |
Iraq War, 2003-2011 - Campaigns |
United States Armed Forces Stability operations Evaluation |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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"Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Approved for public release; distribution unlimited." |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references (p. 171-178). |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Cover; Preface; Contents; Figures; Tables; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Chapter One - Introduction; Background; Objectives; Analytic Approach; Sources of Information; Organization of Monograph; Chapter Two - Iraqi Operational Setting and Unit Characteristics; Characteristics of Anti-Iraqi Forces; Phases of the Insurgency; Unit Organization; Areas of Operation; AO Sizes, Personnel, Funding, and Attached Units; Timeline of Events; U.S. Casualties; Chapter Three - Force Networking, Quality of Information, and Quality of Shared Situation Awareness; Networking Systems |
Effect of Networking Systems on Quality of InformationSpecific Effects of Networking Systems on Quality of Information; Effect of Networking Systems on Quality of Collaboration; Quality of Shared Situation Awareness; Chapter Four - Tactical Stability Missions, NCO-Enabled Processes, and Tactical Mission Effectiveness; Tactical Military Operations in Stability Operations; NCO-Enabled Processes; Speed and Agility of Command; Responsive Maneuver; Networking with Aerial |
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Support and Surveillance Assets; Robustness to Enemy Attack; Stability Operations Intelligence Needs |
Chapter Five - Mission Effectiveness in Stability OperationsU.S. Strategic Objectives and MNF-I Campaign Plan; Assessment Framework; Assessment of Effectiveness-Political Progress; Assessment of Effectiveness-Defeating Terrorists and Containing the Insurgency; Summary of Mission Effectiveness; Chapter Six - Summary: Findings and Recommendations; Assessment of 101st ABD Mission Effectiveness in Stability Operations; Assessment of 3/2 SBCT Mission Effectiveness in Stability Operations; Assessment of 1/25 SBCT Mission Effectiveness in Stability Operations |
Role of NCO Capabilities in Improving Force Effectiveness in Stability OperationsSummary of Network and Intelligence Capabilities; Additional Findings; Recommendations; Appendix A - Director, Office of Force Transformation, Study Authorization Memorandum; Appendix B - SBCT Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Used in OIF; Appendix C - Detailed Results of the Quality of Information and Collaboration Surveys; Appendix D - Iraqi National Elections; Bibliography |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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The Stryker brigade, one of the Army's newest units, has a full complement of Army digital networked communications and battle command systems. An important issue for the Department of Defense and the Army is whether these networking capabilities translate into an information advantage and, if so, whether that advantage results in greater mission effectiveness in stability operations. To answer those two questions, the authors compare three units that operated in the same area in Iraq's northern provinces between 2003 and 2005: the 101st Airborne Division (ABD) (which had only limited digital communications), the 3/2 Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT), and the 1/25 SBCT (both equipped with digital networks) and finds that leadership, training, and tactics and procedures are just as important as networking capabilities for improving mission effectiveness in stability operations. |
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