How insurgencies end / / Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910220125303321
• Autore: Connable Ben
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Santa Monica, CA, : RAND, c2010
• ISBN: 1-282-79724-7; 9786612797248; 0-8330-4983-6
• Edizione: [1st ed.]
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (268 p.)
• Altri autori (Persone): LibickiMartin C
• Disciplina: 355.02/18
• Soggetti: Insurgency; Counterinsurgency
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (p. 223-244).
• Nota di contenuto: Cover; Preface; Contents; Figures; Tables; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE - Introduction; Purpose of This Monograph; A Note on Contemporary Threats and Operations; Research Approach; Graphs Used in This Monograph; Conventional Wisdom; How This Monograph Is Organized; CHAPTER TWO - Classifying Outcomes and Selecting Cases; Outcomes; Type I: Government Loss; Type II: Government Victory; Type III: Mixed (Stalemate/Negotiated Settlement); Type IV: Inconclusive or Ongoing Outcome; The Tipping Point: Explanation by Way of Example; Key Indicators: A Note of Caution; CHAPTER THREE - Assessments of Insurgency Endings: Time and External FactorsAssessments of Time and External Factors; Duration of Conflict; Sanctuary Available; Outside Intervention in Support of Government; Outside Intervention in Support of Insurgencies; CHAPTER FOUR - Assessments of Insurgency Endings: Internal Factors; Structure; Thailand and the BRN and the P ULO; Urbanization; Uruguay and the Tupamaros; Insurgent Use of Terrorism; Insurgent Strength; System of Government; CHAPTER FIVE - Assessments of Insurgency Endings: Other Factors; Force Ratios; Civil-Defense Forces; CHAPTER SIX - ConclusionsAPPENDIX A - Case Studies: Methodology; APPENDIX B - Supplemental Findings; APPENDIX C - Multivariate Regression Analysis; APPENDIX D - Insurgencies Not Examined for This ; Publication; APPENDIX E - Categories Used for the Spring 2006 Survey; APPENDIX F - Unavoidable Ambiguities; APPENDIX G - Questions Used for the Autumn 2006 Survey; Glossary; Bibliography
• Sommario/riassunto: RAND studied 89 modern insurgency cases to test conventional understanding about how insurgencies end. Findings relevant to policymakers and analysts include that modern insurgencies last about ten years; withdrawal of state support cripples insurgencies; civil defense forces are useful for both sides; pseudodemocracies fare poorly against insurgents; and governments win more often in the long run.