|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910220104603321 |
|
|
Autore |
Mackinlay John |
|
|
Titolo |
Rethinking counterinsurgency / / John Mackinlay, Alison Al-Baddawy |
|
|
|
|
|
Pubbl/distr/stampa |
|
|
Santa Monica, CA, : Rand National Defense Research Institute, 2008 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ISBN |
|
1-281-73645-7 |
0-8330-4485-0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Edizione |
[1st ed.] |
|
|
|
|
|
Descrizione fisica |
|
1 online resource (81 p.) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Collana |
|
Rand counterinsurgency study ; ; v. 5 |
Rand Corporation monograph series |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Altri autori (Persone) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Disciplina |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Soggetti |
|
Counterinsurgency - Technological innovations - United States |
Information technology - Government policy - United States |
Military intelligence |
War on Terrorism, 2001-2009 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Lingua di pubblicazione |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
|
|
|
|
|
Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
|
|
|
|
|
Note generali |
|
"MG-595/5-OSD"--P. [4] of cover. |
"Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense." |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nota di bibliografia |
|
Includes bibliographical references (p. 63-65). |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nota di contenuto |
|
Cover; Preface; Contents; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Chapter One - Introduction; Chapter Two - Successful Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies; The Evolution of Insurgency; The Evolution of Counterinsurgency; The Significance of British Experience; The Significance of the Palestinian Insurgency; Chapter Three - Defining the Environment; The Muslim Dimension; Minority Populations; Muslim States; Muslim Populations in the Operational Space; The Process of Radicalisation; Conclusions; The Virtual Dimension; Chapter Four - Rethinking Strategy and Operations; The Strategic Dilemma |
The Counterinsurgent CampaignOperational Capability; Doctrine Deficit; A Generic Version of the Adversary; The Response Mosaic; Using Force; Coalitions; Operations; Measuring Success and Failure; References |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sommario/riassunto |
|
British and U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have been slow to respond and adapt to the rise of the global jihadist insurgency, whose base of support is global and whose exploitation of the virtual dimension has outstripped the West's. After analy |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|