Why the Iraqi resistance to the coalition invasion was so weak / / Stephen T. Hosmer

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910220082003321
• Autore: Hosmer Stephen T
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Santa Monica, CA, : Rand Corporation, 2007
• ISBN: 1-281-18102-1; 9786611181024; 0-8330-4260-2
• Edizione: [1st ed.]
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (177 p.)
• Disciplina: 956.7044/3409567
• Soggetti: Iraq War, 2003-2011; Iraq Armed Forces Operational readiness; Iraq History 1991-2003
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (p. [145]-152).
• Nota di contenuto: Cover; Preface; Contents; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Chapter One - Introduction; The Weak Iraqi Resistance; The Iraqi Failure to Exploit More-Effective Defensive Options; Sources; Organization of the Monograph; Chapter Two - Saddam Made Strategic Miscalculations; Saddam Was the Only Decision maker Who Mattered; Saddam's Decision making Was Seriously Flawed; Saddam Had a Record of Strategic Blunders; Saddam Made Several Strategic Miscalculations in 2003; The Consequences of Saddam's Strategic Misjudgments; Chapter Three - Saddam's Internal Security Concerns Weakened Iraqi Defenses Against External Attack Saddam's Personal Security Measures Were Extreme; Iraq's Forces Were Shaped to Forestall Coups, Uprisings; The Consequences of Saddam's Fixation on Internal Security; Chapter Four - Iraq's Military Strategy and Operations Were Poorly Designed and Executed; Saddam's Military Strategy Was Flawed; Iraqi Defensive Operations Were Poorly Managed and Executed; Iraqis Had to Operate with Reduced Inventories of Old Equipment; Chapter Five - Poor Motivation and Morale Decisively; Prewar Motivation and Morale Were Poor Most Iraqis Saw Defeat as Inevitable; Lack of Belief in the Justness and Necessity of the Cause; ; The Previous Barriers to Desertion Eroded; Air Attacks Had a Devastating Effect on the Iraqi Capability and Will to Fight; Why the Fedayeen Saddam, Ba'athist Militia, and Foreign Jihadists Were Motivated to Fight; The Effects of PSYOPS; The Effects of the Capture of Baghdad; Chapter Six - Superior Military Capabilities Gave Coalition Forces an Overwhelming Advantage; Iraqi Forces Could Not Withstand the Weight and Accuracy of Coalition Firepower; The Coalition Could Attack Iraqi Forces at Standoff Distances and at Night Coalition Armor Dominated in the Ground Fighting; The Speed of U.S. Maneuvers Surprised and Demoralized the Iraqi Defenders; Chapter Seven - Concluding Observations; The Coalition's Success Was Achieved Rapidly and at a Low Cost; But Decision makers Should Be Careful About the Lessons They Draw from OIF; OIF Set the Stage for the Insurgency That Followed; How OIF May Influence the Behavior of the United States' Future Adversaries; Bibliography
• Sommario/riassunto: Coalition forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were able to take down Saddam Hussein's regime in less than three weeks, at the cost of relatively few Coalition casualties. This monograph draws upon information derived primarily from interviews with and interrogations of senior Iraqi military and civilian officials to examine why the Iraqi resistance in March and April 2003 was so weak. The research focused on two questions: (1) Why did the Iraqi Regular Army and Republican Guard forces do so little fighting? and (2) Why did Iraqi leaders fail to adopt certain defensive measures that would h