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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910220080503321 |
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Titolo |
The uses and limits of small-scale military interventions / / prepared for the United States Army ; Stephen Watts ... [et al.] |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Santa Monica, Calif., : RAND, 2012 |
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ISBN |
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0-8330-7658-2 |
0-8330-7656-6 |
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Edizione |
[1st ed.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (210 p.) |
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Collana |
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RAND Corporation monograph series |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Limited war |
Intervention (International law) |
Counterinsurgency |
Military assistance |
United States Armed Forces Stability operations Evaluation |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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"MG-1226-RC"--P. [4] of cover. |
"Arroyo Center". |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references (p. 113-129). |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures; Tables; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE: Introduction; Background: Weak and Failed States and the Problem of Intervention; Weariness with Large-Scale Nation-Building; The Growing Consensus in Favor of Minimalist Stabilization; Moving Beyond the Current Debate; The Concept of Minimalist Stabilization; Approach; CHAPTER TWO: Arguments For and Against Minimalist Stabilization; Costs and Sustainability; Nationalist Backlashes and Golden Hours; Dependency, Adaptability, and Transformation; Control and Escalation |
Conclusion CHAPTER THREE: Overview of the Results of Minimalist Stabilization; Analytic Framework; Empirical Scope of the Research; Military Outcomes: Defining Success; Stabilizing Interventions; Operational Environments; Empirical Results; Outcomes in the Absence of Intervention; Where Do States Intervene?; Consequences of Minimalist Stabilization; Understanding the Role of Operational Environments; Large Interventions; Conclusions; CHAPTER FOUR: Case Studies; El Salvador and the FMLN, 1979-1991; Conflict Narrative; |
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Significant Characteristics of the Operational Environment |
Results of the U.S. Intervention Conclusions; Colombia and the FARC, 1978 to the Present; Conflict Narrative; Significant Characteristics of the Operational Environment; Conclusions; Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, 2002 to the Present; Conflict Narrative; Significant Characteristics of the Operational Environment; Results of the U.S. Intervention; Conclusions; Central African Republic, 1996-1997; Conflict Narrative; Significant Characteristics of the Operational Environment; Conclusions; In Sum; CHAPTER FIVE: Conclusion; The Value of Intervention; Improving the Probability of Success |
Implications for U.S. Partnership Strategies Implications for U.S. Defense Restructuring; APPENDIX: A. Cases and Coding Notes; Bibliography |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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The authors assess the utility and limitations of ""minimalist stabilization""--small-scale interventions designed to stabilize a partner government engaged in violent conflict--and propose policy recommendations concerning when minimalist stabilization missions may be appropriate and the strategies most likely to make such interventions successful, as well as the implications for U.S. Army force structure debates and partnership strategies. |
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