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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910219985903321 |
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Autore |
Perry Walt L |
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Titolo |
Analytic support to intelligence in counterinsurgencies / / Walter L. Perry, John Gordon IV |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Santa Monica, CA, : RAND Corp., 2008 |
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ISBN |
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1-281-73657-0 |
9786611736576 |
0-8330-4526-1 |
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Edizione |
[1st ed.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (85 p.) |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Counterinsurgency - United States |
Insurgency |
Military intelligence - United States |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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"RAND National Defense Research Institute." |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references (p. 55-57). |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Cover; Preface; Contents; Figures; Tables; Summary; Analysis; Conclusion; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE Introduction; The Focus on Conventional Operations; The Hard Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan; About This Monograph; CHAPTER TWO The Nature of Modern Insurgency; Proto-Insurgency; Small-Scale Insurgency; Large-Scale Insurgency; CHAPTER THREE The Dominance of Intelligence; Intelligence Operations in Support of Conventional Combat; Intelligence in Support of Counterinsurgencies; CHAPTER FOUR The Analytic Questions; The Proto-Insurgency; Small-Scale Insurgency |
Large-Scale Insurgency CHAPTER FIVE Intelligence Analysis; Data: Precision Versus Accuracy; Discerning Patterns; Predictive Tools; Analyzing Insurgent Networks: The "Counterinsurgency Common Operational Picture" (COINCOP); Enemy-Friendly Interaction Analyses; CHAPTER SIX Conclusions; Modern Insurgency; The Role of Analysis; Bibliography |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that U.S. forces need more-effective techniques and procedures to conduct counterinsurgency. They will most likely face similar, irregular warfare |
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