1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910164160303321

Autore

Felsenthal Dan S

Titolo

Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate / / by Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2017

ISBN

3-319-51061-4

Edizione

[1st ed. 2017.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (VIII, 88 p.)

Collana

SpringerBriefs in Economics, , 2191-5504

Disciplina

515.8

Soggetti

Economics

Welfare economics

Political science - Philosophy

International Political Economy

Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy

Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods

Political Philosophy

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references at the end of each chapters.

Nota di contenuto

Non-Monotonic Voting Methods: An Overview -- Descriptions of the Voting Methods to be Analyzed -- Some Theoretical Results on Monotonicity-Related Properties of Voting Rules -- Five Voting Rules Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failures Under Both Fixed and Variable Electorates -- Eight Voting Rules Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failures Under Variable Electorates -- Practical Significance and Open Problems.

Sommario/riassunto

This book provides an evaluation of 18 voting procedures in terms of the most important monotonicity-related criteria in fixed and variable electorates. All voting procedures studied aim at electing one out of several candidates given the voters' preferences over the candidates. In addition to (strict) monotonicity failures, the vulnerability of the procedures to variation of the no-show paradoxes is discussed. All vulnerabilities are exemplified and explained. The occurrence of the no-show paradoxes is related to the presence or absence of a Condorcet winner. The primary readership of this book are scholars



and students in the area of social choice.