| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910162925803321 |
|
|
Autore |
Forni Lorenzo |
|
|
Titolo |
Fiscal Rules to Tame the Political Budget Cycle : : Evidence from Italian Municipalities / / Lorenzo Forni, Andrea Bonfatti |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Pubbl/distr/stampa |
|
|
Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2017 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ISBN |
|
1-4755-6998-X |
1-4755-7015-5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Descrizione fisica |
|
1 online resource (21 pages) : illustrations, tables |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Collana |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Altri autori (Persone) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Disciplina |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Soggetti |
|
Political science |
Budgeting |
Macroeconomics |
Public Finance |
Demography |
Single Equation Models |
Single Variables: Cross-Sectional Models |
Spatial Models |
Treatment Effect Models |
'Panel Data Models |
Spatio-temporal Models' |
National Deficit Surplus |
State and Local Budget and Expenditures |
Intergovernmental Relations |
Federalism |
Secession |
Fiscal Policy |
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures |
Other Public Investment and Capital Stock |
National Budget |
Budget Systems |
Demographic Economics: General |
Economics of the Elderly |
Economics of the Handicapped |
Non-labor Market Discrimination |
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General |
Public finance & taxation |
Budgeting & financial management |
Population & demography |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Fiscal rules |
Capital spending |
Budget planning and preparation |
Population and demographics |
Aging |
Fiscal policy |
Expenditure |
Public financial management (PFM) |
Current spending |
Capital investments |
Budget |
Population |
Population aging |
Expenditures, Public |
Italy |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Lingua di pubblicazione |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
|
|
|
|
|
Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
|
|
|
|
|
Nota di bibliografia |
|
Includes bibliographical references. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sommario/riassunto |
|
The paper provides evidence that fiscal rules can limit the political budget cycle. It focuses on the application of the Italian fiscal rule at the sub-national level over the period 2004-2006 and shows that: 1) municipalities are subject to political budget cycles in capital spending; 2) the Italian subnational fiscal rule introduced in 1999 has been enforced by the central government; 3) municipalities subject to the fiscal rule show more limited political budget cycles than municipalities not subject to the rule. In order to identify the effect, we rely on the fact that the domestic fiscal rule does not apply to municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants. We find that the political budget cycle increases real capital spending by about 35 percent on average in the years prior to municipal elections and that the sub-national fiscal rule reduces these figures by about two thirds. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |