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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910162925603321 |
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Autore |
Delgado-Téllez Mar |
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Titolo |
On the Determinants of Fiscal Non-Compliance : : An Empirical Analysis of Spain’s Regions / / Mar Delgado-Téllez, Victor Lledo, Javier Pérez |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2017 |
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ISBN |
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1-4755-6992-0 |
1-4755-6994-7 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (34 pages) : illustrations, tables |
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Collana |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Economics |
Economics - Spain |
Budgeting |
Macroeconomics |
Public Finance |
National Budget |
Budget Systems |
Forecasts of Budgets, Deficits, and Debt |
State and Local Budget and Expenditures |
Intergovernmental Relations |
Federalism |
Secession |
Fiscal Policy |
Debt |
Debt Management |
Sovereign Debt |
Public Administration |
Public Sector Accounting and Audits |
Public finance & taxation |
Budgeting & financial management |
Government debt management |
Fiscal rules |
Budget planning and preparation |
Fiscal consolidation |
Fiscal risks |
Public financial management (PFM) |
Fiscal policy |
Debts, Public |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This paper proposes an empirical framework that distinguishes voluntary from involuntary compliance with fiscal deficit targets on the basis of economic, institutional, and political factors. The framework is applied to Spain’s Autonomous Communities (regions) over the period 2002-2015. Fiscal noncompliance among Spain’s regions has shown to be persistent. It increases with the size of growth forecast errors and the extent to which fiscal targets are tightened, factors not fully under the control of regional governments. Non-compliance also tends to increase during election years, when vertical fiscal imbalances accentuate, and market financing costs subside. Strong fiscal rules have not shown any significant impact in containing fiscal non-compliance. Reducing fiscal non-compliance in multilevel governance systems such as the one in Spain requires a comprehensive assessment of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements that looks beyond rules-based frameworks by ensuring enforcement procedures are politically credible. |
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