1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910786365203321

Autore

Von Mises Ludwig <1881-1973.>

Titolo

Human action [[electronic resource] ] : a treatise on economics / / Ludwig von Mises ; edited by Bettina Bien Greaves

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Indianapolis, : Liberty Fund, c2007

ISBN

1-61487-837-4

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (1124 p.)

Collana

Liberty fund library of the works of Ludwig von Mises

Altri autori (Persone)

GreavesBettina Bien

Disciplina

330

Soggetti

Economics

Commerce

Libros electrónicos

Comercio

Ciencias económicas

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Nota di contenuto

Pt. 1.  Human action.  Acting man -- The epistemological problems of the sciences of human action -- Economics and the revolt against reason -- A first analysis of the category of action -- Time -- Uncertainty -- Action within the world -- Pt. 2.  Action within the framework of society.  Human society -- The role of ideas -- Exchange within society -- Pt. 3.  Economic calculation.  Valuation without calculation -- The sphere of economic calculation -- Monetary calculation as a tool of action -- Pt. 4.  Catallactics or economics of the market society.  The scope and method of catallactics -- The market -- Prices -- Indirect exchange -- Action in the passing of time -- Interest -- Interest, credit expansion, and the trade cycle -- Work and wages -- The nonhuman original factors of production -- The data of the market -- Harmony and conflict of interests -- Pt. 5.  Social cooperation without a market.  The imaginary construction of a socialist society -- The impossibility of economic calculation under socialism -- Pt. 6.  The hampered market economy.  The government and the market -- Interference by taxation -- Restriction of production -- Interference with the structure of prices -- Currency and credit manipulation -- Confiscation and redistribution -- Syndicalism and corporativism --



The economics of war -- The welfare principle versus the market principle -- The crisis of interventionism -- Pt. 7.  The place of economics in society.  The nondescript character of economics -- The place of economics in learning -- Economics and the essential problems of human existence.

2.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910162925603321

Autore

Delgado-Téllez Mar

Titolo

On the Determinants of Fiscal Non-Compliance : : An Empirical Analysis of Spain’s Regions / / Mar Delgado-Téllez, Victor Lledo, Javier Pérez

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2017

ISBN

9781475569926

1475569920

9781475569940

1475569947

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (34 pages) : illustrations, tables

Collana

IMF Working Papers

Altri autori (Persone)

LledoVictor

PérezJavier

Disciplina

330

Soggetti

Economics

Economics - Spain

Budgeting

Macroeconomics

Public Finance

National Budget

Budget Systems

Forecasts of Budgets, Deficits, and Debt

State and Local Budget and Expenditures

Intergovernmental Relations

Federalism

Secession

Fiscal Policy

Debt

Debt Management

Sovereign Debt

Public Administration

Public Sector Accounting and Audits

Public finance & taxation

Budgeting & financial management

Government debt management



Fiscal rules

Budget planning and preparation

Fiscal consolidation

Fiscal risks

Public financial management (PFM)

Fiscal policy

Debts, Public

Budget

Spain

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references.

Sommario/riassunto

This paper proposes an empirical framework that distinguishes voluntary from involuntary compliance  with fiscal deficit targets on the basis of economic, institutional, and political factors. The framework is  applied to Spain’s Autonomous Communities (regions) over the period 2002-2015. Fiscal noncompliance  among Spain’s regions has shown to be persistent. It increases with the size of growth  forecast errors and the extent to which fiscal targets are tightened, factors not fully under the control  of regional governments. Non-compliance also tends to increase during election years, when vertical  fiscal imbalances accentuate, and market financing costs subside. Strong fiscal rules have not shown  any significant impact in containing fiscal non-compliance. Reducing fiscal non-compliance in multilevel  governance systems such as the one in Spain requires a comprehensive assessment of  intergovernmental fiscal arrangements that looks beyond rules-based frameworks by ensuring  enforcement procedures are politically credible.