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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910162706203321 |
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Autore |
Ledwidge Frank |
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Titolo |
Losing Small Wars : British Military Failure in the 9/11 Wars / / Frank Ledwidge |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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New Haven, CT : , : Yale University Press, , [2017] |
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©2017 |
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ISBN |
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Edizione |
[Second Edition] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (352 p.) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Afghan War, 2001-2021 - Campaigns - Afghanistan - Helmand River Valley |
Afghan War, 2001-2021 - Participation, British |
Iraq War, 2003-2011 - Campaigns - Iraq - Baṣrah |
Iraq War, 2003-2011 - Campaigns - Iraq - Baṣrah |
Iraq War, 2003-2011 - Participation, British |
Strategic culture - Great Britain |
HISTORY / Europe / Great Britain / General |
History |
Great Britain Armed Forces Operational readiness |
Great Britain Military policy History 21st century |
Afghanistan Helmand River Valley |
Great Britain |
Iraq |
Iraq Baṣrah |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface to the Second Edition -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. ‘Ridiculous Expectations’ -- Chapter 2. ‘Defeated, Pure and Simple’ -- Chapter 3. ‘Where’s Helmand?’ -- Chapter 4. Uncashed Cheques: Th e Helmand Endgame and Libya -- Chapter 5. Dereliction of Duty: Th e Generals and Strategy -- Chapter 6. Cracking On and Optimism Bias: British Military Culture and Doctrine -- Chapter 7. ‘Tactics Without Strategy?’ |
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The Counterinsurgency Conundrum -- Chapter 8. Managing Violence: The Question of Force -- Chapter 9. Strangers in Strange Lands -- Chapter 10. Fixing Intelligence -- Chapter 11. Thinking to Win -- Conclusion -- Abbreviations and Acronyms -- Notes -- Select Bibliography -- Index |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This new edition of Frank Ledwidge’s eye-opening analysis of British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan unpicks the causes and enormous costs of military failure. Updated throughout, and with fresh chapters assessing and enumerating the overall military performance since 2011—including Libya, ISIS, and the Chilcot findings—Ledwidge shows how lessons continue to go unlearned. “A brave and important book; essential reading for anyone wanting insights into the dysfunction within the British military today, and the consequences this has on the lives of innocent civilians caught up in war.”—Times Literary Supplement |
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