1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910158984403321

Autore

Crane Conrad C.

Titolo

Cassandra in Oz : counterinsurgency and future war / / Conrad C. Crane

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Annapolis, Maryland : , : Naval Institute Press, , 2016

©2016

ISBN

1-68247-020-2

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (258 pages) : illustrations

Collana

Transforming War

Disciplina

355.02/18

Soggetti

Counterinsurgency

Military doctrine - United States

Training manuals

Technical manuals

Iraq War, 2003-2011

Counterinsurgency - Iraq

Counterinsurgency - Afghanistan

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Includes index.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Nota di contenuto

New beginnings : engaging the puzzle palace -- Off to see the wizard : planning for Iraq -- Rearranging the bible : eggheads and jarheads -- Inside the big tent : ringmaster to the stars -- From theory to doctrine : intellectual debates about contemporary warfare -- Behind the curtain : a reader's guide to FM 3-24 -- Malpractice or messiah? : launched into the storm -- Observing the payoff in Iraq : the view from Baghdad -- Turning the switch on and off in Iraq : the view from the field -- Beyond the doctrine : Basrah, Diyala, and Bucca -- Witches and wizards revealed : the coin wave recedes -- Final musings : observations on the long war.

Sommario/riassunto

This book describes how a team of Soldiers, Marines, and civilian academics created Field Manual 3-24/ Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency. The manual's principles and paradoxes of counterinsurgency, focus on legitimacy, and concepts of operational campaign design have had immense influence on U.S. and NATO doctrine. Crane describes the hard work of Soldiers, Marines, and



civilians to achieve peace in places such as Baghdad, Anbar Province, and the detention facilities at Bucca. The book examines what went wrong in Iraq, as peace unraveled with the American departure, and also how the new counterinsurgency doctrine was never properly applied in Afghanistan. The final chapter covers the lessons that should be gleaned from the past.