1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910155013503321

Autore

Gudmundsson Tryggvi

Titolo

Whose Credit Line is it Anyway : : An Update on Banks' Implicit Subsidies / / Tryggvi Gudmundsson

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2016

ISBN

9781475554724

1475554729

9781475554809

147555480X

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (26 pages) : illustrations, tables

Collana

IMF Working Papers

Disciplina

332.15

Soggetti

Loans, Foreign

Banks and Banking

Financial Risk Management

Investments: Stocks

Macroeconomics

Industries: Financial Services

Contingent Pricing

Futures Pricing

option pricing

Banks

Depository Institutions

Micro Finance Institutions

Mortgages

Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation

Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General

Financial Crises

Price Level

Inflation

Deflation

Pension Funds

Non-bank Financial Institutions

Financial Instruments

Institutional Investors

International Financial Markets

Financial Institutions and Services: General

Economic & financial crises & disasters

Banking



Investment & securities

Finance

Financial crises

Asset prices

Stocks

Asset valuation

Prices

Financial institutions

Asset and liability management

Global systemically important banks

Banks and banking

Asset-liability management

Financial services industry

Option pricing

United States

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references.

Sommario/riassunto

The post-crisis financial sector framework reform remains incomplete. While capital and  liquidity requirements have been strengthened, doubts remain over other aspects,  including the fact that expectations of government support for systemically-important  banks (SIBs) remain intact. In this paper, we use a jump diffusion option-pricing approach  to provide estimates of implicit subsidies gained by these banks due to the expectation of  protection to creditors provided by governments. While these subsidies have declined in  the post-crisis era as volatility has declined and capital levels have increased, they remain  non-trivial. Even conservative parameterizations of default and loss probabilities lead to  macroeconomically significant figures.