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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910141437503321 |
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Autore |
Delpech Thérèse |
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Titolo |
Nuclear deterrence in the 21st century [[electronic resource] ] : lessons from the Cold War for a new era of strategic piracy / / Thérèse Delpech |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Santa Monica, Calif., : RAND, 2012 |
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ISBN |
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Edizione |
[1st ed.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (197 p.) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Nuclear arms control |
Deterrence (Strategy) |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Foreword; Contents; Acknowledgments; CHAPTER ONE: Introduction; CHAPTER TWO: Why Is This Subject Important?; CHAPTER THREE: Concepts; The Dominant Concept Under Attack; Extended Deterrence: A Concept Revived; Self-Deterrence: The Best-and Worst-of Worlds; Mutual Assured Destruction: An Old- Fashioned Concept; Stability: The Dream Is Over; Second Strike: A Grand Old Concept with a Bright Future; Parity: A Confused and Confusing Concept; Vulnerable Societies, Invulnerable Weapons: A Paradox; Credibility: An Increasingly Relevant Concept |
Launch on Warning: A Dangerous Concept Uncertainty: A Concept for Our Time; Game Theory: Unreal; Limited Nuclear Wars: Triumph of Hope; Old Wine in New Bottles: Five Samples from the Cold War Cellars; 1. No First Use; 2. Arms Control; 3. Surprise Attacks; 4. Rationality in Deterrence; 5. Elimination; Contemporary Nightmares; Escalation; Accidental War; Nuclear Weapons in the Hands of Nonstate Actors; Adversaries Bent on Gambling; Miscalculation and Misperception; Blackmail; CHAPTER FOUR: Lessons from Crises; Preliminary Crises; 1946: Azerbaijan; 1946: Yugoslavia; Crises over Berlin |
1948: Berlin Blockade 1958-1959: The Status of Berlin; 1961: The Berlin Wall; 1962: The Cuban Missile Crisis; Asian Crises; 1950: Korea (Truman); 1953: Korea (Eisenhower); 1954: Indochina, Operation Vulture; 1954-1955: First Taiwan Strait Crisis; 1958: Second Taiwan Strait Crisis; 1962: India-China War; 1964: The First Chinese Test and |
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Japan's Reaction; 1969: Vietnam, Operation Duck Hook and Operation Giant Lance; 1969: Soviet-Chinese Border Clashes (March-October); 1971: Indo-Pakistani War; Middle East Crises; 1956: Suez Canal Crisis; 1958: Lebanon; 1970: Jordan; 1973: Yom Kippur War |
Misperception 1983: Able Archer Exercise; What Lessons Can Be Drawn from These Crises?; Superiority Is Not the Decisive Factor; But Numbers Do Matter; Leadership Lies at the Very Core of Deterrence; Deterrence Is About Behavior in Daily Life, Not in Brief Crises; The Ability to Take Risks Is Part of Any Success Story; Different Approaches to "Rationality" Should Be Acknowledged; Prudence Should Prevent Unnecessary Risk-Taking; Ignorance Is Blissful-but Dangerous; Subtleties of Deterrence Theory Play Little Role in Times of Crisis |
Strategic Thinkers Nonetheless Had a Far-Reaching Effect on Defense Policy On the Whole, Blatant Moves or Threats, When Credible, Were More Successful Than Uncertainty; Participants Are Never in Full Control of Events; The Past Contains Significant Experience Related to Asia; CHAPTER FIVE: The Age of Small Powers; Iran; North Korea; Pakistan; Syria; Some Thoughts Concerning Small States and International Security; CHAPTER SIX: Ahead of Us: The Big Piracy Game?; China; Russia; An Elusive Strategic Stability; CHAPTER SEVEN: Space and Cyberdeterrence; Space; Cyberspace; Conclusion; References |
About the Author |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Deterrence remains a primary doctrine for dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. The author reviews the history of nuclear deterrence and calls for a renewed intellectual effort to address the relevance of concepts such as first strike, escalation, extended deterrence, and other Cold War-era strategies in today's complex world of additional superpowers, smaller nuclear powers, and nonstate actors. |
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