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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910141009403321 |
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Autore |
Nader Alireza |
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Titolo |
The next supreme leader [[electronic resource] ] : succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran / / Alireza Nader, David E. Thaler, S. R. Bohandy |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Santa Monica, Calif., : Rand/National Defense Research Institute, 2011 |
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ISBN |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (158 p.) |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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ThalerDavid E |
BohandyS. R |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Heads of state - Succession - Iran |
Iran Politics and government 1997- |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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"Prepared for the office of the Secretary of Defense." |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Chapter One - Introduction; The Official Procedure for Selecting Iran's Supreme Leader Is Laid Out in the Iranian Constitution; In Actuality, the Next Succession Is Likely to Occur in a Much Different Way; The Factional Balance of Power; The Prevailing View of Velayat-e Faghih; Khamenei's Personal Network; Other Potential Factors Are Not as Relevant if the Succession Happens in the Near Term |
The Trajectory of the Next Succession Will Hinge on How the Three Principal Factors Are Configured at the Time of Khamenei's Departure Methodology; Roadmap of the Report; Chapter Two - Factor 1: The Factional Balance of Power; The Factional Landscape in Iran; The Islamist Right; The Islamist Left (Reformists); Since the Islamic Revolution, Factionalism Has Been More Influential Than Constitutional Process in Decision making and Policy making Within the Iranian Political System; Khomeini Was Able to Keep Factional Jockeying Largely in Check |
Since Khamenei Came to Power in 1989, Factional Competition Has Grown Markedly in Both Intensity and Influence Chapter Three - Factor 2: The Prevailing View of Velayat-e Faghih; The Absolute View of Velayat-e Faghih; The Democratic View of Velayat-e Faghih; The Quietist View of Velayat-e Faghih; Since Each Faction Has a Different View of Velayat-e Faghih, Whichever Dominates Iran's Political |
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Landscape Will Play a Decisive Role in Shaping Succession; Chapter Four - Factor 3: Khamenei's Personal Network; The Members of Khamenei's Personal Network |
The Supreme Leader Has Historically Maintained a Personal Network Instrumental in Making Key Political Decisions Khomeini's Personal Network Was the Main Driver of the 1989 Succession; Since the Mid-1990s, Khamenei and His Personal Network Have Steadily Consolidated Authority and Are Now the Principal Decision makers in Iranian Politics; Chapter Five - Five Scenarios for Succession of the Supreme Leader in the Near Term; Indicators That Suggest How Factional Competition Is Evolving; Indicators That Point to the Prevailing View of Velayat-e Faghih |
Indicators That Signal How Khamenei's Personal Network Is Developing and the Power It Holds The Configuration of the Three Factors as of 2011; Five Possible Scenarios for Succession of the Current Supreme Leader; Status Quo: The Supreme Leader Remains Powerful But Not Omnipotent; Absolutist: The Supreme Leader, a Dictator, Discards Elected Institutions; Democratic: An Iranian-Stylized Islamic Democracy; Leadership Council: An Executive Body Beholden to Qom; Abolition: Demise of the Islamic Republic; The "Wild Card" Factor: The Nature and Timing of Khamenei's Exit |
The Status Quo and Absolutist Scenarios Seem the Most Likely for the Next Succession |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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As the commander in chief and highest political authority in Iran, the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has played a critical role in the direction of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This monograph identifies three key factors that will shape succession of the next Supreme Leader and outlines five alternative scenarios for the post-Khamenei era. It situates all of this within the context of the June 2009 election. |
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