Even if "man does metaphysics as he breathes" (Meyerson), it has become almost natural to consider that it is for the sciences to tell us what the world is made of and hence what it is. Metaphysics, for its part, could not teach us anything about objective reality: at best it can inform us about certain necessary features of what we think about it. Also, to reflect on the relations between metaphysics and the sciences, is it certainly to evoke their tense links throughout history and therefore the validity, for both of them, of certain calls to order. . It is then to suggest, to avoid scientism and apriorism, a few simple rules of good conduct. Finally, it is betting, at least if we want to rule out an idealism which threatens scientists and metaphysicians alike, on the double possibility of scientific realism as such and of a scientific metaphysics capable of telling us, without having to envy the sciences. , which is true, of course, of what we think of reality, but also and above all of reality in itself (Lowe). These are the major issues that arise today not only for the philosopher and the historian of science and the metaphysician (in the traditional sense that we are used to giving these terms in France), but to the philosopher as such, to which, incidentally, certain crucial problems relating to language, knowledge or even ethics |