1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910136605903321

Autore

Bulman David Janoff

Titolo

Incentivized development in China : leaders, governance, and growth in China's counties / / David J. Bulman [[electronic resource]]

Pubbl/distr/stampa

New York : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2016

ISBN

1-316-86695-5

1-316-86803-6

1-316-86821-4

1-316-61737-8

1-316-69449-6

1-316-86839-7

1-316-86911-3

1-316-86857-5

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (xiii, 270 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)

Classificazione

POL040020

Disciplina

338.951

Soggetti

Regional economics - China

Provincial governments - China

Central-local government relations - China

Economic development - China

China Economic conditions Regional disparities

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 01 Nov 2016).

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Nota di contenuto

Machine generated contents note: List of tables; List of figures; Acknowledgements; 1. Introduction; 2. Understanding China's county-level economic growth; 3. Governance for growth: investment attraction and institutional development; 4. First in command: leadership roles for county development; 5. Paths to promotion: the inconsistent importance of economic performance; 6. Ignoring growth: the institutional and economic costs of maintaining stability; 7. Conclusion: a new political economy of uneven regional development; Appendix 1; Appendix 2; Index; Bibliography.

Sommario/riassunto

China's economy, as a whole, has developed rapidly over the past 35 years, and yet its richest county is over 100 times richer in per capita



terms than its poorest county. To explain this vast variation in development, David J. Bulman investigates the political foundations of local economic growth in China, focusing on the institutional and economic roles of county-level leaders and the career incentives that shape their behaviour. Through a close examination of six counties complemented by unique nation-wide data, he presents and explores two related questions: what is the role of County Party Secretaries in determining local governance and growth outcomes? And why do County Party Secretaries emphasize particular developmental priorities? Suitable for scholars of political economy, development economics, and comparative politics, this original study analyzes the relationship between political institutions, local governance, and leadership roles within Chinese government to explain the growing divergence in economic development between counties.