The Catalan world map of the R. Biblioteca Estense at Modena / with Memoir by George H. Kimble

• Record Nr.: UNINA990008822120403321
• Autore: Kimble, George Herbert Tinley <1908- >
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: London : Royal Geographical Society, 1934
• Descrizione fisica: 10 p. ; 37 cm
• Collana: Reproductions of early manuscript maps ; 2
• Locazione: ILFGE
• Collocazione: Cons.1 Atl.1 149
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia

Liberalism and value pluralism / / George Crowder

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910822319103321
• Autore: Crowder George
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: London ; ; New York : , : Continuum, , 2002
• ISBN: 1-4411-8807-X
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (289 p.)
• Collana: Political theory and contemporary politics
• Disciplina: 320.51
• Soggetti: Liberalism - Philosophy; Liberalism - Moral and ethical aspects; Social values; Pluralism
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (pages 263-273) and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Cover; Contents; Preface and Acknowledgements; 1 Introduction; Part I: Liberalism and Value Pluralism; 2 Liberalism and its Justification; 3 ; Value Pluralism; Part II: Pluralist Arguments: Liberal and Anti-Liberal; 4 From Pluralism to Anti-Utopianism: Berlin''s Case; 5 Pluralism against Liberalism? Conservatism and Pragmatism; Part III: From Pluralism to Liberalism; 6 From Pluralism to Liberalism I: Diversity; 7 From Pluralism to Liberalism II: Reasonable Disagreement; 8 From Pluralism to Liberalism III: Virtues; 9 Pluralist Liberalism; 10 Conclusion; References; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; IJ; K; L; M; N; O; P; R; S; T; U; V; W; Y
• Sommario/riassunto: Value pluralism is the idea, associated with the late Isaiah Berlin, that fundamental human values are irreducibly plural and incommensurable. Ends like liberty, equality and community are intrinsic goods which can neither be ranked in an absolute hierarchy nor translated into units of a common denominator. If that is true, how can we choose among such values when they come into conflict in particular cases? In particular, what reason is there to justify the value ranking characteristic of liberal democracy, favouring personal autonomy and toleration? Recent commentators have seen value plural