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1. |
Record Nr. |
UNICAMPANIAVAN0071697 |
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Autore |
Pompei, Edoardo |
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Titolo |
Circoli aziendali e ricreativi : tutti gli adempimenti amministrativi e fiscali dei circoli e delle associazioni / Edoardo Pompei |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Milano : Il sole-24 ore professione impresa, 1991 |
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ISBN |
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Descrizione fisica |
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Disciplina |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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2. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910820798803321 |
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Titolo |
Causation, permission, and transfer : argument realisation in GET, TAKE, PUT, GIVE and LET verbs / / edited by Brian Nolan, Institute of Technology, Blachardstown Dublin ; Gudrun Rawoens, Ghent University ; Elke Diedrichsen, Microsoft European Headquarters, Dublin, Ireland |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Amsterdam ; ; Philadelphia : , : John Benjamins Publishing Company, , [2015] |
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©2015 |
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ISBN |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (505 pages) : illustrations (some color) |
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Collana |
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Studies in Language Companion series, , 0165-7763 ; ; volume 167 |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Causative (Linguistics) |
Grammar, Comparative and general - Verb |
Principles and parameters (Linguistics) |
Generative grammar |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references and index. |
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3. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910972000003321 |
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Autore |
Niemeck Maik |
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Titolo |
First-Person Thought : Action, Identification and Experience / Maik Niemeck |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Paderborn, : Brill | mentis, 2022 |
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ISBN |
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Edizione |
[1st ed.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (242 pages) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Selbstbewusstsein |
Bewusstsein |
Immunität gegenüber Fehlern durch Fehlidentifikation |
De Se Skeptizismus |
Indexikalische Gedanken |
Selbstsorge |
Nicht-begriffliches Selbstbewusstsein |
Prä-reflexivs Selbstbewusstsein |
Emotionen |
Selbst-Repräsentationalismus |
Self-Consciousness |
Consciousness |
Immunity to Error through Misidentification |
De Se Skepticism |
Indexical Thought |
Self-Concern |
Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness |
Pre-reflective Self-Consciousness |
Emotions |
Self-Representationalism |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Intro -- Content -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. What is Special about First-Person Thought? -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The Essentiality of First-Person Thought - Messy Shoppers, Weird Attitudes and Attempts to Deal with Them -- 1.3 De Se Skepticism and the Action Inventory Model (AIM) -- 1.4 Restricting the Essentiality Thesis -- 1.5 Arguing Against the Action Inventory Model -- 1.6 Peculiarities of First-Person Thought and their Role for Action -- 1.6.1 The Necessary Double Reflexivity of First-Person Thought -- 1.6.2 The Effortlessness and Security of First-Person Thought -- 1.6.3 Excursus: Relational Awareness and Indexical Thought -- 1.6.4 Excursus: Relational Awareness and the Use of the First Person in Speech -- 1.7 The Motivational Force of First-Person Thought - A Research Desideratum? -- Chapter 2. Is the First Person Thick? -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Setting the Stage: Specifying the Thesis and Exposing its Historical Roots -- 2.3 What is Special about First-Person Concern? -- 2.4 Specifying the Nature of the Evaluative Component -- 2.5 Introspective Consciousness and Concern -- 2.6 Is Concern for One's Own Mental States Concern for Oneself? -- 2.7 Some Empirical Support -- 2.8 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 3. Demystifying Immunity to Error through Misidentification -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Getting IEM right -- 3.2.1 Reference Failure and Errors through Misidentification -- 3.2.2 The Reasoning behind Errors through Misidentification -- 3.3 IEM as a Property of Thought Types? -- 3.4 IEM as a Property of Thought Tokens? -- 3.5 The Ubiquity of IEM as a Property of Thought Tokens -- 3.6 What about the Infallibility Intuition? -- 3.7 IEM and Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence -- 3.7.1 Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence and Property Possession -- 3.7.2 Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence, Immediacy and Identification. |
3.7.3 Metaphysical IEM - Reviving Partial Infallibility -- 3.7.4 Resumé - What Can Be Gained from Metaphysical IEM? -- 3.7.5 Metaphysical IEM and its Relation to Self-Awareness and First-Person Thought -- 3.8 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 4. Self-Identification and the Regress -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Shoemaker on Self-Identification -- 4.3 Which Conclusion to Draw? -- 4.4 Two Potential Issues with Shoemaker's Regress Argument -- 4.4.1 The Scope Problem -- 4.4.2 The Implausible Constraint Problem - Identification without Descriptive Beliefs? -- 4.5 How to Deal with these Worries? -- 4.5.1 The Scope Problem -- 4.5.2 The Implausible Constraint Problem -- 4.5.3 Some Consequences for the Relation between Self-Awareness and Perception -- Chapter 5. The Argument for Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The Argument Based on the Meaning of 'I' -- 5.3 Possible Objections to the Argument Based on the Meaning of 'I' -- 5.4 The Cognitive Role of Consciousness and Replies to the Objections -- 5.4.1 Preliminaries: The Mind-Body Relation -- 5.4.2 The Functional Correlates of Consciousness -- 5.4.3 Reply to the Objections -- 5.5 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 6. How to Account for the Subjective Character of Experience? -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Self-Representationalism -- 6.2.1 From Higher-Order to Same-Order Representationalism -- 6.2.2 Self-Representationalism and the Subjective Character -- 6.3 Is the Subjective Character a Representational Content? -- 6.3.1 Do we Perceive Ourselves? -- 6.3.2 Can all Conscious Creatures Believe that they are? -- 6.3.3 Is the Subjective Character Something in Between? -- 6.4 Potential Issues of Self-Representationalism -- 6.5 The Concept of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness -- 6.6 Potential Issues of the Concept of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness -- 6.7 The Self-Mode of Experience. |
6.7.1 The Subjective Character as a Way of Experiencing -- 6.7.2 What are Intentional Modes? -- 6.7.3 Justification - Is There a Place for |
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Intentional Modes? -- 6.7.4 The Subjective Character as an Intentional Mode -- 6.8 The Evaluative Function of Modes - Subject Concerning Relations -- 6.9 Virtues of the Self-Mode Account -- 6.10 Concluding Remarks: Some Unresolved Questions and Objections -- Chapter 7. Conclusions -- Literature -- Index. |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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The book offers new answers to two central questions that have been heavily debated, especially in recent years, in the debate on so-called de se skepticism: Is there something special about first-person thinking? And how does it relate to other forms of self-consciousness? The answer to the first question is a resounding "yes." This assertion is justified by the double-reflexive structure, motivational force, and specific concern that first-personal thinking involves. Regarding the second question, the book concludes that there are non-linguistic forms of self-consciousness. However, these should not be understood as representational contents or non-relational properties, but as mental relations that, without themselves being represented, can contribute to the phenomenal character of conscious states. In this respect, the book also provides a justification for the rarely considered impure intentionalism. |
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