Record Nr.

UNINA9910461468403321

Autore

Jacobs Alan M.

Titolo

Governing for the long term : democracy and the politics of investment / / Alan M. Jacobs [[electronic resource]]

Pubbl/distr/stampa


Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2011

ISBN


1-107-21459-9
1-139-06314-6
1-283-11093-8
9786613110930
1-139-07539-X
0-511-92176-4
1-139-07994-8
1-139-07765-1
1-139-06963-2
1-139-08221-3

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (xiv, 306 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)

Disciplina

331.25/2

Soggetti

Social policy

Social choice

Political planning

Welfare economics

Externalities (Economics) - Political aspects

Pensions - Government policy

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Nota di contenuto

Machine generated contents note: Part I. Problem and Theory: 1. The politics of when; 2. Theorizing intertemporal policy choice; Part II. Programmatic Origins: Intertemporal Choice in Pension Design: 3. Investing in the state: the origins of German pensions, 1889; 4. The politics of mistrust: the origins of British pensions, 1925; 5. Investments as political constraint: the origins of US pensions, 1935; 6. Investing for the short term: the origins of Canadian pensions, 1965; Part III. Programmatic Change: Intertemporal Choice in Pension Reform:

7. Investment as last resort: reforming US pensions, 1977 and 1983; 8. Shifting the long-run burden: reforming British pensions, 1986; 9. Committing to investment: reforming Canadian pensions, 1998; 10. Constrained by uncertainty: reforming German pensions, 1989 and 2001; Part IV. Conclusion: 11. Understanding the politics of the long term.

Sommario/riassunto

In Governing for the Long Term, Alan M. Jacobs investigates the conditions under which elected governments invest in long-term social benefits at short-term social cost. Jacobs contends that, along the path to adoption, investment-oriented policies must surmount three distinct hurdles to future-oriented state action: a problem of electoral risk, rooted in the scarcity of voter attention; a problem of prediction, deriving from the complexity of long-term policy effects; and a problem of institutional capacity, arising from interest groups' preferences for distributive gains over intertemporal bargains. Testing this argument through a four-country historical analysis of pension policymaking, the book illuminates crucial differences between the causal logics of distributive and intertemporal politics and makes a case for bringing trade-offs over time to the center of the study of policymaking.